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Abstract
We introduce a model in which a regulator employs mechanism design
to embed her human capital beta signal(s) in a firm’s capital structure,
in order to enhance the value of her post career change indexed exec-
utive stock option contract with the firm. We prove that the agency
cost of this revolving door behavior increases the firm’s financial lever-
age, bankruptcy risk, and affects estimation of firm value at risk (VaR).
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1 Introduction
This paper extends the literature on contingent claim analysis of career
option, introduced by Bodie et al. (2008, Sec. II), to firm bankruptcy risk
induced by career concerns1 of a regulator in a revolving door setting2. The
intuition behind our model is regulators have incentives to regulate firms
that can provide them with more lucrative career change employment. They
bring value to the firm either by reducing shareholders financing costs, or
by withholding expected consumer surplus that might arise in regulatory
pricing decisions3. In either case, the regulator’s employment option value
depends on the firms levered beta coefficient. Relative to any given beta
level that might hold in the case of a disinterested regulator, we argue there
will be a beneficial impact on the firms beta when a regulator exercises her
career option to join the firm4. Whereas Treussard (2007) and Bodie et al.
(2008) solve the problem of when to switch careers, our model’s focus is on
what happens once a regulator decides to switch career and take an executive
level position with a firm she regulates. Here, she embeds her human capital
beta5 in the firm’s capital structure and observes a valuation effect. As a
part of the decision process to switch career choices she negotiates an indexed
option contract that includes firm value considerations6.
A seminal paper by Spiegel and Spulber (1994, pg. 429, eq (6)) shows how
regulators’ welfare functions are tied to a firm’s capital structure through
debt. And a more recent paper by Bortolotti et al. (2011) report that highly
levered firms receive more favorable regulation. In our model, the regula-
tor utilizes her human capital beta as a signalling device. High betas signal
tough regulator and regulator expertise to prospective employers. Low betas
signal lax regulator who curries favor, and lobbying potential to consulting
firms. See e.g., DeHaan et al. (2012). We show how the beta parameter can
be used to manipulate the barrier in an indexed executive stock option con-
tract in order to increase the value of the regulator’s post career-change early
exercise premium. See e.g., Goldman and Slezak (2006). In that context,
the volatility of firm value increases. See e.g., Johnson and Tian (2000a);
1See e.g., Holmstro¨m (1999)
2See e.g., Che (1995) and Salant (1995)
3Houston et al. (2013); Litzenberger and Sosin (1979).
4See e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2013).
5This is a beta pricing result in (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996, eq(22)) where return on
human capital is used to augment a conditional CAPM model. In (Bodie and Treussard,
2007, pg. 43) human capital beta refers to a lifetime portfolio allocation fraction that does
not change.
6Dittmann et al. (2013) highlight disincentive effects of indexed contracts.
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Jørgensen (2002). Thus, we employ a signal dependent option pricing model
by Guo (2001) and Shepp (2002) to identify firm bankruptcy risk in bad
states by comparing firm vega 7, and firm value at risk (VaR), with and
without regulator signals embedded in capital structure. In a broad sense,
our model falls under rubric of the Jensen and Meckling (1976, pg. 333)
agency theory of capital structure, as opposed to the Modigliani and Miller
(1958) capital structure irrelevancy model.
1.1 Significance of results
Our results bear significance for financial policy. For example, they are
consistent with Kane (2009, pg. 164) who proposed a model with asymmet-
ric information in which opacity grows with a financial firm’s product line.
There, opacity causes regulators to overestimate firm capital and underes-
timate firm leverage and volatility. Even though Kane (2009) deals with
regulatory failure, the salient characteristics of his model applies to ours.
For our firm overestimates the contractual benchmark, and underestimates
its volatility because of opacity in the regulator’s ability to manipulate the
benchmark with human capital beta. Given the increased firm bankruptcy
risk predicted by that behaviour in our model, Kane (2010, pg. 155) advo-
cacy of an incentive pay scheme for regulators is apropos. There, bonuses
or raises are framed as deferred compensation which would be forfeited if a
crisis occurs within a given time frame after the regulator resigned. This is
tantamount to a monitoring device in the form of a performance vested bar-
rier option with a down-and-out feature. See e.g., Johnson and Tian (2000b,
pg. 8). In effect, it mitigates the regulator’s rent seeking via manipulation
of her human capital beta signals.
Our model also applies to “regulation by assimilation” instruments such
as a firm’s value-at-risk (VaR). For instance, VaR was developed by pri-
vate industry as a risk management tool and subsequently “assimilated”
or adopted by regulators. Macey (2013, pg. 629). Our model shows how
estimates of the VaR statistic is inflated by regulator signals. Given that
regulators permit firms’ to exercise discretion in computing their VaR statis-
tic, our formulae suggests consequential moral hazard from firms reporting
the lower of two numbers derived from (1) regulator suggested formula; and
(2) firm internal formula.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 develops the abstract
mechanism design, and abstract call option pricing strategy for a regulator
7See e.g., Hull (2006, pp. 359-360)
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who wishes to quit and join firm management at a future date known only
to the regulator. In section 3 we apply the mechanism and option pricing
strategy by and through (i) the regulators human capital beta; (ii) the stock
price benchmark which is a decision criterion; and (iii) the process whereby
the regulator embeds her human capital beta in the firms capital structure,
and (iv) we solve the regulators option problem. In section 4 we present
the main result of the paper’s bankruptcy risk criterion, and conclude in
section 5.
2 Regulator career call option contract with reg-
ulatory signalling
2.1 Regulator mechanism design
In this section, we briefly describe the abstract mechanism design8 utilized
to embed regulator signals in the firms capital structure to affect the value
of her [call] option contract upon career change. An important paper by Che
(1995) analyzes revolving door behaviour in an hierarchical structure consis-
tent with mechanism design. There, the principal (the government) hires an
agent (the regulator) to monitor the behaviour of another agent (the firm) to
effect compliance with given legislation. By contrast, Salant (1995) consid-
ers revolving door behaviour in the sub-game between the regulator and the
firm. Our model is distinguished because we consider a mechanism design
in which a regulator employs (1) costly human capital beta signals to secure
(2) lucrative indexed ESOP contracts upon termination of its contract with
the principal. Our regulator has sufficient lead time to observe and compare
her current compensation package to prospective managerial compensation
with ESOP she receives upon exercising a career option to join firm manage-
ment. Thus, her risky compensation is based on a prospective equity stake
in the regulated firm. Related papers by Ruffino and Treussard (2007) and
Treussard (2007, pp. 4-5) used a utility model approach to American style
option9 to analyze career choices. However, Carpenter (1998) showed that
extension of an American style option model works just as well as elaborate
utility maximizing models. Thus, we pose and solve the regulator’s prob-
lem in the context of an American style indexed option without resorting to
8The interested reader is referred to Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2008) for a brief survey or
Bo¨rgers (2008) for a more detailed exposition on mechanism design theory, and Dal Bo´
(2006, pg. 208, Appendix) for details on application and implementation in the context of
a revolving door model.
9See e.g., Myneni (1992) for a review of the literature.
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utility theory.
We implement our model as follows. Let Θ be a type space for regulators,
i.e., tough or lax, and Ω be a sample space for states of nature, Ft be the σ-
field of Borel measurable subsets of Ω at time t, P be a probability measure
on Ω, and F be a filtration of information {F}t≥0. Thus, the probability
space in our model is characterized by (Ω, {F}t,F, P ). Let X be an outcome
space, and f be a stochastic choice function such that f : Ω × Θ → X is a
direct mechanism. Based on her type, the regulator sends a state dependent
signal s into some strategy space G, i.e. s : Ω×Θ→ G to affect the firm’s
response10. On the basis of interactions in G, i.e. the firms response, the
regulator maps a payoff function or contract C into X, i.e C : G → X.
For instance, the space G may comprise the signal s(ω, θ), θ ∈ Θ, ω ∈ Ω
obtained from the regulator’s welfare maximization11; a menu of profits Π
for the firm, and the strategic form g. So that
G = {s(ω, θ),Π, g} (2.1)
The regulator builds personal value in the space, given their perceived capac-
ity to affect regulations interpretation in ways that benefit the prospective
employer firm. Undeniably, regulation controls the strategy space available
to the firm in this case. However, the regulator’s signal s(ω, θ) is subject to
the vagaries of the state of nature ω and her type θ..
Definition 2.1 ((PC): Regulator’s participation constraint).
Let K be the compensation package of the regulator, assumed fixed over
the epoch of career mobility, and V (ω, θ,Π) be the signal dependent value
of the firm as a function of profits. The regulator will participate in exercise
of a state contingent career [call] option contract when
C(s(ω, θ)) = (αV (ω, θ,Π)−K)+
for some equity stake 0 < α < 1 
10For example, a regulator could provide a more favorable re-
port on a firm than warranted by the facts. See e.g.,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/bank-examiner-was-told-to-back-off-goldman-suit-says/?hp& r=0.
Last visited 2013/12/01
11For example, in a deterministic setting with regulator type θ, let Π(·, θ) be firm profit,
CS(·, θ) be consumer welfare, W be the regulators welfare function, and α be a decision
weight such thatW (·, θ;α) = (1−α)CS(·, θ)+αΠ(·, θ), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Solve an optimization
problem for W to obtain an expression for a control variable such as price p(θ;α) that
affects firm profit Π. Here, strategy space G will be characterized by p(θ;α), and the
“strategic form” taken by p. If α > 1
2
, then greater decision weight is placed on firm
profit which may be a function of capital structure. See e.g., Spiegel and Spulber (1994,
pg. 429).
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Lemma 2.1 ((IC): Regulator’s incentive compatibility constraint).
Given the probability measure space (Ω, {F}t,F, P ), let θ be the regulator’s
true type and θ̂ be any other reported type. Then for some [Borel] measure-
able event A ∈ Ft we have∫
A
C(s(ω, θ))dP (ω) ≥
∫
A
C(s(ω, θ̂))dP (ω)
That is, the regulator has incentive to reveal her true type θ because the
expected value of her career option is greater than it would be otherwise if
she does not. 
Proof. See e.g., subsection A.112.
Definition 2.2 (Revelation principle).
Given any feasible career option mechanism C : G → X, there exist a
feasible direct mechanism f : Ω×Θ → X such that for A ∈ F we have the
isomorphism ∼= given by
f(ω, θ) ∼= (C ◦ s)(ω, θ) (2.2)∫
A
f(ω, θ)dP (ω) =
∫
A
(C ◦ s)(ω, θ)dP (ω) (2.3)

Remark 2.1. f is the contract that would be observed with perfect infor-
mation and full disclosure. However, it may violate conflict of interest or
anti-corruption laws. See e.g., Zeume (2012). By contrast, the [indirect]
contract (C ◦ s) contains elements known only to the regulator, and they
may be revealed over time. 
On the basis of the foregoing definitions we formulate the following
Proposition 2.2 (Regulator’s abstract career call option contract with reg-
ulated firms). Given (Ω,Ft,F, P ), a type space Θ for regulators, G a strategy
space, C a contract, M = (G,C) an abstract mechanism, and s be a reg-
ulatory signalling function such that s : Ω × Θ → G; let f : Ω × Θ → X
be the regulator’s stochastic choice function mapped into outcome space X.
Specifically, let C be the regulator’s career [call] option contract with regu-
lated firms. We claim that the abstract value of the option is given by the
mechanism:
f(ω, θ) ∼= (C ◦ s)(ω, θ)
where ∼= represents an isomorphism. 
12We thank Haim Abraham for requesting a proof of this constraint.
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Remark 2.2. The isomorphic relationship in Definition 2.2 was indirectly
characterized in Bodie et al. (2008, pg. 291)(“[W]e apply [contingent claims
analysis] CCA to the issue of career choices. The ability to change careers
over one’s working life is isomorphic with an option to exchange one asset
for another.”). This is similar to a Margrabe (1978) option and lends itself
to index executive option pricing. 
2.2 The value of the firm and related regulator call option
In this section we derive the value of the firm. With few exceptions, the as-
sumptions below are consistent with Merton (1974, pg. 450). A significant
departure is the asymmetric information induced by regulator signals that
constitute a source of market friction that affects the firm’s capital struc-
ture. See e.g., e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kwan (2009). Since the
firm responds to the signal(s) it receives from the regulator, let V (s(θ)) be
the value of the firm13. The regulator’s potential contract or“managerial
compensation” with the firm is functionally equivalent to an equity stake in
the firm, αV, 0 < α < 1, upon her career change. If K ∈ X is the “value”
of the regulators current compensation package, then [s]he can exercise her
[call] option at any time t. The erstwhile ”abstract” topological lifting in
Definition 2.2 and Proposition 2.2 shows that the stochastic choice function
at time t reduces to
f(t;ω, θ) = (αV (t, s(ω, θ))−K)+ (2.4)
More formally, that abstract [call] option contract takes the form
C(τ∗;V, s(θ)) = sup
τ∈T ,θ∈Θ
(αV (τ, s(θ))−K)+ (2.5)
where τ ∈ T is a stopping time and τ∗ is the optimal stopping time in the
set T of all admissible early exercise times for the regulator14. The foregoing
is summarized in the following
Lemma 2.3 (Regulator’s career call option). The value of the regulator’s
career call option contract C(t, V, s(θ)) increases when embedded regulatory
signals increases firm value V (s(θ)). 
Of course V (s(θ)|Ft) is the value of the firm at time t given the “filtration”
of information F, and it has to be discounted from some “terminal date” T .
13 The notation here is slightly more general than that for the definitions above.
14Lukas and Welling (2013) show how to derive optimal α and τ in a real option pricing
model.
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Specifically, in the sequel firm value is assessed at the stopping time for the
[former] regulator’s early exercise date for her American style option. See
e.g., Myneni (1992) for a taxonomy of American option pricing. That is,
firm value, and hence the career option, is computed in a sequential move
setting as follows:
1. Regulator assesses her potential receptiveness and possible compensa-
tion premium from firm under extant circumstances.
2. Given the assessment, the regulator decides to switch employment and
sends.
3. Regulator enters American style index executive stock option contract
with firm upon career change.
4. Regulator’s early exercise date τ is used as terminal date to evaluate
firm bankruptcy analysis in European style option setting
The former regulator’s executive stock option compensation scheme is influ-
enced by her human capital beta. See e.g., Hall and Murphy (2000)(managerial
stock options); Grace and Phillips (2008)(insurance commissioners human
capital signaling) and Tahoun (2013) (price of stocks held by Congress).
More on point, given firm debt D, the firm’s [signal dependent] equity is
given by:
E(s(θ)) = V (s(θ))−D (2.6)
So the regulator’s virtual call option is based on
C(τ∗;V, s(θ)) = sup
τ∈T ,θ∈Θ
(αV (τ, s(θ))− αD)+ (2.7)
This implies that the strike price in (2.5), based on the value of the regu-
lator’s pre-career change compensation package, must be compared to the
firm’s debt firm debt (αD) which serves double duty as the strike price in
Merton (1974) firm valuation formula in (2.7). This Margrabe (1978) style
option pricing problem was solved by Treussard (2007) and Bodie et al.
(2008). So we take it as given in the sequential move setting above.
3 Valuation of regulator career option contract
with equity stake in the firm
We assume that the regulator’s program consists of a prospective American
style indexed option contract, with a regulated firm, which satisfies a linear
7
growth condition. See e.g., Musiela and Rutkowski (2005, pg. 174). More-
over, the index is based on stocks of a select peer group of competitor firms.
See e.g., Jørgensen (2002, p. 323); Johnson and Tian (2000a, pg. 40). We
make the following
Assumption 3.1.
1. Index I(t, ω) represent common factor in firm performance
2. The firm’s stock price is decomposable into impact of (1) a common
factor, and (2) an idiosyncratic factor
3.1 Solving the regulator’s program via American style in-
dexed executive stock option contract
Let H(t, ω) be the benchmark index observed by the firm and the regula-
tor. We now show how the regulator use human capital beta to manipulate
the benchmark. See e.g., DeHaan et al. (2012) for empirical evidence on
“human capital hypothesis” in revolving door context. The regulator and
firm enters an indexed [call] option contract (S(t, ω)−H(t, ω))+ with asym-
metric information in which the firm and regulator observes H(t, ω) but
not the true benchmark H(t, ω; s(θ)) known to the regulator. Following,
Johnson and Tian (2000a, pp. 40-41), we let the index I(t, ω) and stock price
S(t, ω) follow geometric Brownian motion (B) processes with correlation ρ
(after suppressing (t, ω)) given by:
dS
S
= µSdt+ σSdBS (3.1)
dI
I
= µSdt+ σIdBI (3.2)
dBS dBI = ρdt (3.3)
Here, we assume that dividend payout rate is zero. To characterize bench-
mark index dynamics, we apply the formulae in Jacka (1991, Prop. 2.3(i), Thm. 4.3)
for an American put option by changing the signs and probability statement
in Jacka’s equation (4.3)15 accordingly. In that case the regulator’s call op-
tion is decomposed as:
C(t, S; r) = H(0)− S(0) + rH(0)
∫ t
0
e−ruPr{S(u, ω) > H(u, ω)}du (3.4)
15Jacka’s K(x, t) is our C(t, S; θ). Kim (1990, pp. 551, 553) solves the American call
option problem, with early exercise premium, using iterative methods.
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where H(u, ω) is a de facto time varying boundary which gives rise to the
stoping time
τH(ω) = {t ≥ 0;S(t, ω) = H(t, ω)} (3.5)
From (3.4) and (3.5) the regulator’s early exercise premium (REEP) is given
by the quantity:
REEP(τH) = rH(0)
∫ τH
0
e−ruPr{S(t, ω) ≥ H(t, ω)}du (3.6)
When H(t, ω) decreases, the probability Pr{·} increases and the value of the
early exercise premium REEP(τH) increases as well.
To establish a nexus between regulator signal and stock price volatility
we turn to the index option pricing models in Johnson and Tian (2000a,
pg. 40) and Jørgensen (2002, pg. 328). There, the benchmark stock price
(H) is obtained from lognormality assumptions, see Hull (2006, pg. 533),
which, in the context of our model gives us:
H(t) = EP [S(t, ω)] = S(0)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)βvw
eηt (3.7)
η = (r +
1
2
ρσSσI)(1− βvw) (3.8)
Here, η is excess returns; r is a riskless interest rate, and σS , σI are volatil-
ities; βvw = ρ(σS
σI
) is a measure of systemic risk with the [value weighted]
index in a pseudo-CAPM framework. See e.g., Johnson and Tian (2000a,
pp. 41-42) for further details on formulae.
3.1.1 The regulator’s human capital beta
The interplay between firm capital structure and employee compensation is
fairly established in the literature. For example, Berk et al. (2010, pp. 907-
908) introduced a model in which firms with higher leverage pay higher
wages. And Chemmanur et al. (2010) provides empirical evidence that the
compensation of newly hired CEOs is positively impacted by firm leverage.
In this section we employ Jagannathan and Wang (1996, pg. 15, eq(22))
human capital beta pricing model to establish a nexus between firm leverage
and compensation. Those authors decomposed CAPM beta into a value
weighted and labor (human capital) component as follows:
β = bvwβ
vw + blaborβ
labor (3.9)
9
If we take bvw as numeraire we can rewrite the equation as
β′ = βvw + b′laborβ
labor (3.10)
However, the β in (3.7) is based on the [value weighted] benchmark. The
absence of human capital beta in that benchmark implies that equation (3.7)
is misspecified. Substitution of βvw from (3.10) in (3.8) gives us
η̂ = η + b′laborβ
labor (3.11)
where η = 1− β′. Thus, the true benchmark (unobserved by the firm)with
human capital signals is given by
H(t, βlabor) = S(0)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)β′
exp(η̂t) (3.12)
= S(0)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)β
exp(ηt)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)b′
labor
βlabor
exp(b′laborβ
labort) (3.13)
= H(t)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)b′
labor
βlabor
exp(b′laborβ
labort) (3.14)
⇒ H(t) = H(t, βlabor)
(
I(t)
I(0)
)−b′
labor
βlabor
exp(−b′laborβlabort) (3.15)
The implicit lognormal relationship in (3.14), see e.g., Hull (2006, pp. 274-
275), suggests that after cancelling out the common time variable t
σ2H
(
βlabor
)
= σ2H +
(
b′laborβ
labor
)2
σ2I > σ
2
H (3.16)
Thus, by increasing human capital signal βlabor the regulator is able to (1)
increase true benchmark volatility, and (2) lower the contractual benchmark
in (3.15)16. Whereupon, [s]he is able to increase the early exercise premium
(REEP) in (3.6) and consequently the value of her call option. This foregoing
analysis is summarized the following
16This result is invariant to regulator type. For example, following the conditional
beta paradigm in Ferson and Schadt (1996, pp. 429-430), rewrite (3.10) as β = (b0 +
b1Z)β
labor + bvwβ
vw where for some threshold β⋆, Z = 1 for high beta type βlabor > β⋆
and Z = 0 for low beta type βlabor ≤ β⋆. Thus, βlabor 7→ b0β
labor for low or βlabor 7→
(b0 + b1)β
labor for high types. For each type, σ2H
(
βlabor
)
> σ2H .
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Lemma 3.2 (Regulator’s induced volatility).
Let θ = βlabor; H(t) be the benchmark in (3.7) observed by firm and regu-
lator; H(t, θ) be the benchmark in (3.12) known only be the regulator; and
S(t, ω, θ) = H(t, θ) + ǫ(t, ω) be the firm’s stock price, where ǫ ∼ iid(0, σ2ǫ ).
Let σS be stock price volatility without regulator signalling, and σS(θ) be
stock price with regulator signalling. Then σS(θ) > σS. 
Proof. See e.g., subsection A.2.
Remark 3.1. If we include a Kane-type penalty function ∆ > 0 in the beta
pricing relationship in (3.10), then in the event of regulatory failure it be-
comes β′∆ = β
vw + (b′labor − ∆)βlabor. In which case volatility in (3.16) is
reduced and the value of the option is reduced as well.
3.2 Embedding regulator signals in firm equity
In the last section we set θ = βlabor to illustrate how human capital beta
influences the career call option contract. For notational convenience, we
use θ in the sequel. In the context of (2.7), we apply Merton (1974, pp. 453-
454) formula for the option value of the equity in a firm with value V and
background driving Brownian motion, and debt D. Specifically,
f(V, τ) = V Φ(x1)−D exp(−rτ)Φ(x2) (3.17a)
x1 =
log V
D
+ (r + σ
2
2 )τ
σ
√
τ
(3.17b)
x2 = x1 − σ
√
τ (3.17c)
where f(V, τ) is option value of firm equity, r is a risk free rate, τ = T − t
for exercise date T for a European call option priced at time t; and Φ is the
cumulative normal. From the outset we note that
αf(V, τ) = αV Φ(x1)− αD exp(−rτ)Φ(x2) (3.18)
The right hand side of that equation is isomorphic to a call option
C(·) = (αV − αD)+ (3.19)
So the regulator’s valuation rests on comparing her current compensation
package K to the psuedo-strike price αD that depends on the firm’s debt.
That is, the exercise of her career change option rests on the evaluation
(αV −K)+ T (αV − αD)+ (3.20)
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We assume that the regulator knows V,K and D but she does not know
fraction α on the early exercise date. Thus, if she believes that K < αD so
that (αV − K)+ > (αV − αD)+, then her valuation of the firm is greater
than its actual value. So she would be inclined to exercise a Margrabe
option to “exchange” the subject cash flows by quitting accordingly, and
joining the firm17. What is more, the regulator now has incentive to design
a mechanism that increases firm leverage. So she looks more favorably at
levered firms because a highly levered firm increases the value of her career
change option. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence
which finds that privately controlled firms use leverage strategically to obtain
better regulatory outcomes. See e.g., s.g. Bortolotti et al. (2011). More
important, it explains the finding in Dal Bo´ (2006, pp. 217-218) which finds
that regulators increase their support for industry interest during their last
year in office. Therefore, in the sequel we assume that K < αD.
3.3 Regulator career option pricing with signalling
Because θ is unobservable, its presence in firm value, i.e. stock price, implies
that the latter may follow a hidden Markov process. Guo (2001) and Shepp
(2002) introduced an information based stock price model on the canoni-
cal probability measure space (Ω,F ,F, P ) with filtration F, which, in the
context of Proposition 2.2, is parameterized as
dV (t, ω)
V (t, ω)
= µ(s(t, ω, θ))dt+ σ(s(t, ω, θ))dW (t, ω) (3.21)
where s(t, ω, θ) is itself an unobservable [hidden] Markov process. However,
to simplify matters we will assume that s(t, ω, θ) = s(θ). That is, the signal
is a deterministic control18. In that case, the problem is reduced to one of
an American style option where the regulator embeds a deterministic signal
in the value of the firm, and she can exercise her option to join the hitherto
regulated firm at any time. Thus, firm value dynamics is given by
dV (t, ω)
V (t, ω)
= µ(s(θ))dt+ σ(s(θ))dW (t, ω) (3.22)
More on point, Shepp (2002, pg. 1373) and Guo (2001) introduce evidence
that information asymmetry is dispositive of volatility dynamics, and the
17This problem was solved by Treussard (2007) and Bodie et al. (2008), and is not
dispositive of our main results.
18See e.g., Øksendal (2003, pg. 237)
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activity of insiders leads to increased volatility. That artifact of their model
is consistent with Boyle et al. (2011) who find that high volatility firms
should use more stock options to compensate their executives. See e.g., also,
Haug and Taleb (2011, §5.4, pg. 104) for information dependent volatility in
option pricing. In our model, those phenomena are represented by Lemma
3.2 on page 11. Thus, in (3.22) we have
σ(s(θ)) > σ (3.23)
Using the formulae in (3.17), we find that
f(V (s(θ)), τ) = V (s(θ))Φ(x1)−D(s(θ)) exp(−rτ)Φ(x2)) (3.24a)
x1(s(θ)) =
log V (s(θ))
D(s(θ)) + (r +
σ(s(θ))2
2 )τ
σ(s(θ))
√
τ
(3.24b)
x2(s(θ)) = x1(s(θ))− σ(s(θ))
√
τ (3.24c)
In the sequel we write x1(θ) and x2(θ) instead of x1(s(θ)) and x2(s(θ)).
To ascertain the impact of regulator signals on firm value, we compare the
value of the option on the firm with embedded regulator signal to the value
without signal. To do that we turn to option Greeks by examining the
vega (ϑ) of the option on the firm19. That is, for the mean zero normal
distribution function φ, let ϑ(0) and ϑ(s(θ)) be the vega without and with
regulator signals respectively. And define
ϑ(0) =
∂f(V, τ)
∂σ
= V φ(x1)
√
τ (3.25)
ϑ(s(θ)) =
∂f(V (s(θ), τ)
∂σ(s(θ))
= V (s(θ))φ(x1(θ))
√
τ (3.26)
According to Lemma 3.2
ϑ(s(θ)) > ϑ(0) (3.27)
⇒ V (s(θ))φ(x1(θ))
√
τ > V φ(x1)
√
τ ⇒ V (s(θ))
V
>
φ(x1)
φ(x1(θ))
(3.28)
According to Lemma 2.3 a more levered firm with embedded regulator
signals enhances regulator career option. Thus, we have
φ(x1)
φ(x1(θ))
> 1⇒ exp
(
−
(
x21
2
− x1(θ)
2
2
))
> 1 (3.29)
⇒− x1(θ) < −x1 and x1(θ) > x1 (3.30)
19See e.g., Hull (2006, pg. 361) for derivation of formula for vega.
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Gropp et al. (2006, pp. 405-406) defined−x1 as the “distance to default” and
found that it was a predictor of bank stability and or bankruptcy. In fact,
they report that “the banks that were downgraded * * * had a significantly
higher mean value of [x1] than those that did not” in the 6-18 months prior
to downgrade. See e.g., also Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013). The analysis
below provides a theoretical explanation.
4 Bankruptcy with regulatory signals in firm vega
and leverage
The foregoing arguments show that the vega for the option value of the firm
is dispositive of regulator incentive to leverage regulated firms. See e.g.,,
Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012). According to Kolmogorov Inequality,
see e.g. Athreya and Lahiri (2006, Thm. 8.3.1, pg. 249), and (3.23), if ϕ
is the proportion of total tail probability in the lower tail, then for some
threshold value λ and assuming maximal probability thresholds we have the
nonparametric result
Pr
(
max
θ
{x1(θ)} < −λ
)
= ϕ
Var(x1(θ))
λ2
(4.1)
= ϕ
σ˜2x1(θ)
λ2
> ϕ
Var(x1)
λ2
= ϕ
σ˜2x1
λ2
(4.2)
where σ˜2x1(θ) and σ˜
2
x1
are the variances of x1(θ) and x1 respectively. The
result in (4.2) is important because it says that the “large deviation prob-
ability”20 for firm value at risk included in x1(ωb, θ), i.e. tail risk in bad
states ωb ∈ Ω, is greater than the corresponding probability if there was no
regulatory signals or “regulatory capture” embedded in capital structure21.
To see this rewrite V (s(θ)) in (3.24) as V (θ) so that after algebraic reduction
we have
lim
σ(θ)→∞
Pr
{
max
θ
V (θ) < max
θ
D(θ) exp
(
−λσ(θ)√τ −
(
r+ σ
2(θ)
2
)
τ
)}
> ϕ
σ˜2x1
λ2
(4.3)
⇒ Pr{max
θ
V (θ) < 0} > ϕ 1
λ2σ2τ
Var
(
ln
V
D
)
(4.4)
20See e.g., Varadhan (2008)
21By the same token, if regulator signals induce less volatility, i.e. σ˜2x1(θ) < σ˜
2
x1
then
the firm is less likely to be bankrupt but stock option based compensation will be reduced.
See e.g., Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012).
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where σ˜2x1 =
1
σ2τ
Var(ln V
D
). Equation 4.4 is equivalent to a bankruptcy
condition. It says that if regulator signals induce too much volatility, i.e.
uncertainty, in firm value, then the probability that the value of the firm
is negative, i.e. it goes bankrupt, is greater than a given threshold without
regulator signals. This result characterizes Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
where regulators signalled that they were not going to provide liquidity for
a highly levered bank. See e.g., Adrian and Shin (2010) and Taylor et al.
(2012). The Kane penalty function in Remark 3.1 mitigates this risk.
Thus we have proven the following
Proposition 4.1. [Bankruptcy condition] Assume that regulators embed reg-
ulatory signals θ in firm capital structure. Then firm value-at-risk x1(ωb, θ)
in bad states of nature (ωb) is greater than x1(ωb)–its value in non-revolving
door regimes–and the probability of bankruptcy is higher than it would be in
the absence of regulator signals. 
Remark 4.1. This proposition should not be interpreted to mean that in a
world with no regulation, firm value-at-risk will be lower than with regula-
tion. The proposition is based on an assumption of asymmetric information
between firm and regulator. Thus, more transparency and even imposition
of a Kane penalty mitigates against our bankruptcy result. 
5 Conclusion
This paper derives a firm bankruptcy risk result based on a regulator’s career
concerns in a revolving door setting. We argue that before career-switch,
regulators embed their human capital [beta] in a target firm’s capital struc-
ture. We show how regulators use their human capital beta to affect the
early exercise premium in their subsequent indexed executive stock option.
Further, we show how that behaviour increases a firm’s bankruptcy risk,
and estimation of its value at risk (VaR). In the United States, conflict of
interest and anti-lobbying laws are in place to mitigate against some of the
predictions of our theoretical model. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §207, 21 U.S.C.
§1602(3). To the best of out knowledge, the results in this paper are new
to the literature on corporate finance and mechanism design. However, the
overarching theme is how the vagaries of regulation contributes to financial
instability. Of course, we have one caveat. Like public servants everywhere,
regulators approach their careers with varying degrees of commitment to
public service. One set of these will be open to and will entertain alterna-
tives to public service. Our model is relevant to this subset. However, we
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would expect that there are others whose passion is fed by a public trust,
and as such are not expected to do other than adhere to their expected
charge of bringing maximum consumer surplus benefits from their charge as
regulators.
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of incentive compatibility constraint 2.1
We assume that the regulator enters an indexed option contract C(S(t, ω),H(t, ω); θ) =
(S(t, ω) − H(t, ω))+ with stock price S(t, ω), and time varying benchmark
H related to her type θ such that [suppressing ω] H(t) = H(t, θ)e−θt. Let
θ̂ = θ + ǫ where ǫ ∼ (0, σ2ǫ ). Assume that H is twice differentiable in θ.
Thus,
Ĥ(t, θ) = H(t, θ̂)e−θ̂t (A.1)
≈
(
H(t, θ) +H
θ̂
(t, θ)ǫ+H
θ̂θ̂
(t, θ)
1
2
ǫ2
)
e−θte−ǫt (A.2)
⇒ EP [Ĥ(t)] ≈ EP
[(
H(t, θ) +H
θ̂
(t, θ)ǫ+H
θ̂θ̂
(t, θ)
1
2
ǫ2
)(
1− ǫt+ 1
2
ǫ2t2
)
e−θt
]
(A.3)
= H(t) +
(1
2
H
θ̂θ̂
(t, θ)−H
θ̂
(t, θ)t+
1
2
H(t, θ)t2
)
σ2ǫ e
−θt (A.4)
⇒ EP [Ĥ(t)] ≥ H(t) (A.5)
So by not revealing her true type our regulator will set a higher performance
benchmark for herself! And the value of C will be reduced. Therefore, it is
in her interest to reveal her true type in order to lower the benchmark for
performance. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. When there is no signal, we have σ2S = σ
2
H + σ
2
ǫ . With signals,
according to (3.16), we have σ2S(θ) = σ
2
H +
(
b′laborβ
labor
)2
σ2I + σ
2
ǫ > σ
2
S =
σ2H + σ
2
ǫ .
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